The following cases involve private land regulation in the context of land use law and disability:
Abdus-Sabur v. Hope Village, Inc., 221 F.Supp.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
Tags
- Private land
- ADA
- FHA
- RHA
- Handicap
- Accessibility
- Reasonable accommodation
Story
The plaintiff was a quadriplegic man at the end of a prison sentence. He entered a pre-release program, which allowed him to live in a halfway house for the last few months of his term. A privately-owned corporation offered such housing to eligible persons. The plaintiff required a wheelchair to move freely. However, the shower in the halfway house was not very friendly to the plaintiff’s wheelchair. After he fell trying to maneuver from his wheelchair to the shower bench, he was transferred back to the Correctional Treatment Facility. After several falls at the facility, the man requested different equipment that would allow him to more safely manage showering.
Legal Claims
The plaintiff brought claims against the private halfway house for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RHA), and the Fair Housing Act (FHA).
Holding/Reasoning
The D.C. Circuit held first, the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the private halfway house under Title II of the ADA. They said “Residential reentry centers are notably distinctly private, as absent a criminal sentence, members of the public cannot get accommodation in such facilities. Additionally, re-entry centers do not as a general course of business provide goods or services to the general public. Consequently, they are private facilities not accessible to the general public and therefore not a place of public accommodation as defined.”
Next, the court held that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It said “the scope of section 504 is limited to “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), in the form of a subsidy and not merely a benefactor of federal funding, which is what the plaintiff here alleges.” Thus, there could be no relief under the RHA. Nor could the same RHA claims move forward against the Town in which the home belonged. Similarly, the Town did not receive federal funds as required under the statute.
Finally, the court determined the plaintiff could not bring a claim against the Town under the Fair Housing Act. It stated, “even construing the Fair Housing Act as broadly as possible, the clear language of the statute restricts the class of people who can bring a claim under § 3604(f)(1) to a ‘buyer or renter,’ or, at its broadest, individuals who were otherwise denied the opportunity to become a buyer or renter. There is no such allegation that the [plaintiff] fall[s] into either category. “ As such, the Town was not on the hook for the FHA claims.